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Europe faces the intertwined issues of debt, recession and economic uncertainty. These 
issues also impact its climate and energy policy, and in particular the EU Emissions Trading 
System (EU ETS). However, improvement to the EU ETS could enhance European prospects 
for economic stabilisation, investment and recovery. 
This report, Strengthening the EU ETS, analyses the underlying issues affecting the EU 
ETS, and sets out the main response options. The core conclusion is that no individual 
measure adequately addresses the combined needs: to restore confidence, to stabilise 
expectations, and to provide a strategic context for huge investment in the EU energy sector. 
A combination of measures would best meet Europe’s needs: 
a. Set-aside of allowances to ‘recalibrate’ the EU ETS, 
b. A rising reserve price on future auctions, or similar mechanisms that establish a de-facto 
‘floor price’, to restore confidence in its robustness for the purposes of investment and 
financial stability, and
c. Accelerated negotiations on post 2020 strategies and commitments.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Context: need and rationales
Europe needs a new generation of energy investment, 
up to €1,000bn in its energy system over the coming 
decade, and much improved energy efficiency. The 
EU ETS was expected to provide a rising carbon price 
to help drive investment in both energy infrastructure 
and energy efficiency. With the move to auctioning 
from next year, the EU ETS was also projected to raise 
€150-200bn in public revenues over Phase III (2013-
20). The expectation was that these revenues would be 
divided between the needs of general public finance, 
the specific needs for new energy infrastructure, and 
climate finance including international commitments. 
However, the combined impacts of recession, response 
to the carbon price in 2008-11, and complementary 
measures, have led to a surplus of emission allowances 
that will last out to 2020. As a result, EU ETS allowance 
prices have collapsed. This undermines the EU ETS’s 
value as a driver of either emission reductions or 
investment. At a time of economic uncertainty and 
fiscal crisis, EU energy-related industries have lost 
orientation for investment, and governments have  
lost an expected €100bn of auction revenue. 
Action is needed. The EU is developing strategic 
roadmaps which require investment of many hundreds 
of billions of Euros in long-lived energy assets. Such 
investment must meet Europe’s needs for long term 
energy and climate security, and would also serve 
macroeconomic goals. However, it is not consistent  
or credible to expect such investment whilst allowing 
the carbon price – a price that is ultimately an output  
of political decisions – to languish well below €10/tCO2  
for several years, instead of the €25 to €40/tCO2 
projected when the EU ETS Phase III Directive was 
adopted. Industry responds more to what it sees in 
markets than what it is told about the future, but the 
massive dichotomy raises the cost and risks of all 
energy sector investment. The present situation serves 
neither Europe’s economic or environmental interests. 
Action is justified. The original policy setting for  
Phase III of the EU ETS was inconsistent: delivery 
of multiple goals (including renewables and energy 
efficiency), and emission offsets, together would 
anyway have led to an inadequate ETS outcome 
without a stronger target. This inconsistency was partly 
justified by the expectation of moving to 30% upon a 
global deal. While international action on emissions 
abatement continues to develop, it is unlikely to deliver 
clarity in a useful timeframe: at the same time, the 
scale and duration of the European recession – a 
plausible force majeure on its own – has weakened  
the outlook so much that a surplus of emission 
allowances is now projected to last past 2020. 
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Figure ES-1: Price and Quantity in the EU ETS
The options
Concerns around the EU ETS are not just about 
the price or quantity of allowances, but also about 
the credibility of and expectations for future 
emissions prices. Price and quantity in emissions 
trading schemes serve different, and potentially 
complementary, roles over both the short term and 
longer term (Figure ES-1). Addressing these quantity 
and price issues requires remedies that are strategic as 
well as tactical, complementary and not piecemeal.
This report outlines the needs and prospects for 
longer term clarity, but this cannot on its own address 
the current situation. For more immediate action 
we analyse five options summarised in Table ES-1, 
reflecting different degrees of ambition, effectiveness, 
timescale, and procedural and political feasibility.
 
Quantity measures 
Earlier studies by Climate Strategies suggested that 
revisions to the overall 2020 target, involving all sectors 
and with a complex political history, would make most 
sense in the context of clarifying longer-term strategy 
towards 2030. Such targets serve international as 
well as domestic purposes, and may be linked to the 
international post-Durban negotiations. But achieving 
EU ETS price impacts through this approach would 
require both changing the EU ETS cap and amending 
the Directive: these actions would be problematic as  
a near-term response. 
Tightening the EU ETS cap trajectory on its own would, 
by implication, require consensus on changing the 
long-term default trajectory, and would similarly require 
revision to the Directive. It would risk conflating this 
strategic decision with a fix to ‘mop up’ the current 
surplus over time, hence also making it quite uncertain 
how the current price would actually respond. 
The immediate solution being politically considered  
is the set-aside of emission allowances, so as to reduce 
the current supply of allowances and therefore boost 
the price. This avoids many of the problems of the 
above options, and has strong justification. Set-aside 
is necessary because the extent of oversupply to 2020 
makes the system wildly out of balance from either  
its intended role or strategic needs. 
Set-aside could aim to restore the EU ETS to 
approximately the balance intended at the time of 
adopting the Phase III rules, a ‘recalibration’ to take 
account of the factors noted. If 1,400MtCO2 were set 
aside (the level initially proposed in the EU Parliament) 
and not returned within Phase III, central estimates 
suggest the price might rise towards €20/tCO2.  
If so, corresponding revenues across Europe would  
rise above €20bn/y, including around €1bn/y in 
Greece, and €2bn/y in Spain and Italy, for example.
Yet on its own, set-aside would not adequately resolve 
the problems of deep uncertainty, or address the 
strategic needs. The uncertainties which stalk the 
European economy and energy system impact both 
energy demand and supply mix. If the 1,400MtCO2 
suggested were set aside and not returned within  
Phase III,¹ and any subsequent adjustment was 
precluded, a simple ‘stress test’ suggests that  
Phase III price developments could still range  
widely: from below €10/tCO2 to above €30/tCO2. 
The ETS was established to deliver environmental 
goals efficiently, at a reasonable balance of cost and 
environmental ambition, and to support low carbon 
investment. Supplementary roles include finance and 
contributions to the international efforts. For the EU 
ETS to fulfil these objectives, set-aside is necessary, 
but on its own is insufficient. 
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Figure ES-2: EU ETS Prices compared against Australian and Californian ETS price corridors
Price-related measures 
The move to auctioning in Phase III introduces an 
important option which did not previously exist. 
Negotiating a rising reserve price on future ETS 
auctions would establish a de-facto floor price for the 
EU ETS, demonstrably reducing the downside risk for 
investors and helping to attract badly-needed capital 
to the energy sector. Some other approaches could 
perform a similar role, but a reserve price would 
make explicit the implicit judgement signalled by all 
intervention, about what constitutes a ‘too low’ price.  
Economics research has increasingly emphasised the 
value of ‘hybrid’ instruments which combine price 
and quantity features. This reflects explicitly that all 
environmental policy in reality is a balance of economic 
and environmental objectives, embedded in uncertainty. 
Floor prices are a feature in the US State and Australian 
cap-and-trade systems, and the EU ETS is now alone in 
not having such a mechanism (Figure ES-2). 
A Reserve Price for Auctions (RPA) on its own would 
not, however, be appropriate, as: 
•	 the current scale of oversupply would then eclipse 
any purchase from auctions for several years – 
removing any revenue benefits; and 
•	 the ‘reserve price’ would in fact then just define the 
price, removing the responsiveness of trading and 
undermining the strategic value of quantity goals.  
An RPA is not a substitute for adequate targets or 
(in the current circumstances) set-aside. Rather, it 
provides automatic insurance if the level of set-aside 
proves inadequate in the face of other economic and 
policy developments. It would reinforce the system by 
removing – by design – the scale of downside risk that 
low carbon investors perceive from the the EU ETS to 
date. It could set in place an enduring alternative to 
repeated interventions in the face of uncertainty.
The legal and political scope for such a measure in 
Phase III remains to be determined; the legal issues 
appear to be similar to those for set-aside itself. An 
indicative reserve price beyond 2020, for Phase IV of 
the EU ETS, could help to stabilise prospects and also 
provide a clearer framework for negotiations on Phase 
IV and 2030 goals. A rising trend in reserve prices 
would send an unambiguous strategic signal.
In the absence of an appropriate EU policy response, 
some Member States are likely to ‘go it alone’ in a 
bid to stabilise their investment climate, as the UK 
has already done with a national carbon floor price 
defined through adjustments to domestic taxation. 
This is a ‘double-edged sword’. A coalition of countries 
taking such measures could establish the principle. 
Yet, it introduces competitiveness concerns within the 
single market and could undermine the achievement 
of a single harmonised EU carbon price through the 
EU ETS, with fragmentation also at odds the intent of 
the Third Energy Package. Such an outcome would 
clearly not be in the long-term interests of the EU, its 
industry, or the environment. However, given the need 
for investment, such national responses may be better 
than a continued vacuum in EU responses. 
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Primary 
Objectives
Secondary 
Objectives
Delivery
Tighter GHG 
Target
Accelerated  
ETS Trajectory
Efficient near-
term emissions 
reductions³
Contribution to 
EU position in 
international 
climate 
negotiations
Political 
possibilities
Legal 
possibilities
Timing
Partial
Yes
Varied national 
positions; effort 
to move to 25% 
in 2011 was 
blocked
Any subsidiary 
change to ETS 
cap would 
require amended 
Directive
Past rejection 
may impede; 
likely linked with 
international 
negotiations
Partial
Yes (through 
higher price 
and long-run 
commitment)
Similar to politics 
of GHG target
Would require 
amending 
number in 
Directive
Unclear, but 
slowed by 
the long run 
implications 
and need for 
amendment
Yes
Indirectly through 
increase
Leading proposal 
from the EU 
Parliament
Probably 
possible through 
Comitology, 
probably would 
need to release 
set-aside by 2020
Fastest option – 
already in active 
consideration
Yes
Indirectly, 
and greater 
predictability 
might help
May be tensions 
over clearer fiscal 
implications
Probably possible 
without new 
legislation on 
similar basis to 
set-aside
Decision in 
principle could 
be fast; setting 
level likely to take 
longer
Limited
No, not an EU 
position and  
would reduce  
ETS prices
UK introducing 
price floor and 
contracts
Does not involve 
EU legislation
Can be fast 
through national 
legislation, though 
implementation is 
complex
Efficient 
Investment:  
price stability  
and certainty
Revenue
No – but 
improved if/when 
post 2020 clarity
Increase depends 
on level of target 
and split with 
ETS cap
No – but 
improved if/when 
post 2020 clarity
Increase depends 
on level of cap
Depends 
on clarity of 
rationales and 
market reactions
Less than 
corresponding 
cap change 
(free allocations 
preserved but 
price uncertainty)
Yes, if level 
adequate to 
ameliorate 
downside risk
Similar to 
corresponding 
set-aside but 
much less 
downside risk
Partial – fallback 
option if no EU-
level action
Could increase 
revenue for 
countries involved 
and avoids 12% 
revenue recycling 
to Eastern Europe
Set-Aside
Reserve Price 
Auction 4
National price 
floors and 
contracts
Table ES-1: The five individual interventions assessed against ETS objectives and deliverability.1
1 A likely interpretation of the EU ETS Directive is that decisions on timing of emission allowances released through auctions can be 
made through Committee procedures (not requiring any revisions to the Directive), but that all allowances should be made available  
by the end of the period. However, if the intent were there, it would be easy to adjust the cap yet to be negotiated for Phase IV so as  
to absorb any ‘intended’ degree of banked allowances associated with set-aside.
2 Note the core finding that no individual instrument offers an adequate response: along with accelerated efforts to clarify post 2020 
frameworks, a combination of two measures would be required to first ‘recalibrate’ (through set-aside) and then restore confidence  
in an adequate degree of stability to support investment. 
3 The impact of measures on emissions obviously depends on the strength of the intervention. Tighter 2020 target and lowered ETS 
trajectory are indicated as “partial” because, with a focus towards 2020, they would not promptly address the current surplus and 
the analysis of Neuhoff et al (2012) suggests that the scale of this surplus creates a market driven by financial rather than industrial 
banking, with much higher discount rates. Set-aside would address this promptly, RPAs may do so depending on levels and how the 
terms are specified.
4 The report analyses Reserve Price Actions as the simplest mechanism for automatically adjusting quantities in the market to restore 
price, if a growing surplus leads to price collapse (which is the historical pattern). The text notes there are also other, less direct,  
option to achieve similar goals.
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Strategic processes: beyond 2020 
Major energy-related investments, particularly  
in infrastructure, need a vision and framework beyond 
2020. Negotiations towards 2030 commitments, 
building on the EU Roadmap processes, are urgently 
required. They need to start and develop as soon as 
possible, but involve more than just a focus on 2030 
targets and/or the EU ETS cap trajectory. 
Roadmaps will be required not just for energy,  
but for all the main sectors covered by the EU ETS.  
A comprehensive view will need to integrate these 
including the impact of complementary measures, 
investment trends, concerns about carbon leakage, 
infrastructure and innovation needs.  
Longer term targets need to be built upon these 
foundations. The sheer scale, scope and importance  
of such commitments means that they are likely to take 
a long time to resolve, and may be linked also with the 
2015 target deadline for global negotiations under the 
Durban platform. Balance is required: trying to rush  
a comprehensive post-2020 commitment as a solution  
to the current market price risks repeating past errors. 
A comprehensive adequate agreement may take a long 
time to reach and with an 8-18 year time horizon from 
today may be heavily discounted in the current market. 
Negotiations towards 2030 are essential, and could 
clarify the needs of strategic investors in key sectors, 
but cannot sensibly ‘fix the current price’.
Conclusions 
Alongside the processes for Roadmaps and  
post-2020 negotiations, the present opportunity lies  
in how Europe handles the evident need to strengthen 
the EU ETS, in terms of the both quantity recalibration  
and price confidence. A triad of measures are  
required to meet three distinct needs:  
•	 Set-aside to restore the ETS price (and auction 
revenues) to meaningful levels, and restore 
confidence that EU policy will provide market 
signals that are consistent with science, 
international and strategic processes.   
•	 Rising Reserve Price Auctions or other measures 
to cap downside risks for investors and to stabilise 
minimum auction revenue expectations in the face 
of deep uncertainties; these would also reduce 
tensions between the ETS and complementary 
measures, and preclude the prospect of ongoing 
interventions through further set-aside. 
•	 Negotiations towards 2030 goals, initially based 
around sector specific needs and building up to a 
comprehensive agreement on 2030 commitments, 
set in the realities of both domestic possibilities 
and international developments.  
The three measures address different needs and are 
mutually reinforcing. Anything less risks leaving the EU 
ETS, and European industry and its economy, struggling 
with the consequences for many years to come.
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Introduction 
The EU, and in particular the Eurozone, is facing enormous and enduring economic 
challenges. These challenges have understandably reduced the attention and priority given 
to climate change, which in turn has contributed to serious problems in the EU’s current 
climate policy. 
Most notably, Europe has expended huge political capital to establish and strengthen  
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, which sets an EU-wide price on emissions. 
When key decisions were taken for Phase III, out to 2020, prices were projected to rise  
to about €40/tCO2: they have recently fallen below €7/tCO2. 
The recession has been a major factor reducing carbon prices; however, this report 
shows that it is far from the only one. The link between climate and economic challenges 
works both ways: macroeconomic trends affect the EU ETS, while the EU ETS itself has 
macroeconomic dimensions:
•	 Europe needs a massive new generation of investment in its energy sector, yet the 
uncertainties in the macroeconomic environment and the instability of the carbon price 
combine to deter investment precisely at a time when the European economy needs 
substantial inward investment to help generate growth and jobs. 
•	 European governments need revenue, yet the collapse in allowance prices has reduced 
expected revenues from EU ETS auctions by the order of €100bn to 2020. 
These economic issues cannot be resolved by ignoring 
climate change. The Stern Review (Stern 2006) showed 
the real and costly risks associated with not reducing 
emissions fast enough, and so having to deal with the 
consequences of major climatic change. Using energy 
more efficiently will deliver immediate economic 
advantages, including construction sector employment 
through retrofitting programmes. Expanding new 
energy sectors such as renewables has the potential  
to deliver economic advantages over the mid and 
longer term.
The EU has, rightly, set itself a demanding long-term 
climate change goal: to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions by 80-95% by 2050. The Commission has 
published ‘roadmaps’ for how this could be done.  
A clear policy framework for low-carbon transformation 
is needed, to create an attractive environment for 
investment and innovation in Europe’s energy sector, 
which can strengthen its role in a changing global 
economy. 
The EU ETS has been strengthened since its 
introduction in 2005. But weaknesses remain, as 
revealed starkly by the present situation. This study 
examines options for strengthening European climate 
policy, and in particular the EU ETS, in context of wider 
challenges. Climate policy defined purely in terms of 
reducing emissions is no longer sufficient. It must  
be seen to do so efficiently, effectively, pragmatically 
and in line with the EU’s other strategic challenges.  
This report explores how this can be achieved.
Part I outlines the main objectives of European climate 
policy and the EU ETS, explains the current situation 
and considers the extent to which this meets the key 
objectives.  
Part II then considers options for strengthening the  
EU ETS, grouped into the two main types:
Reducing the quantity of allowances
•	 Tightening the 2020 GHG reduction target,  
and/or adopting a 2030 target
•	 Lowering the ETS cap and tightening the 1.74% 
annual reduction trajectory
•	 Setting aside phase III allowances
Ensuring a minimum price
•	 Setting a Reserve Price on the EU ETS Auctions 
(RPA), or other ‘auto-adjustment’ approaches
•	 National measures
•	 Other measures 
Part III examines the possible relationship and 
interplay between different options, recognising that EU 
climate policy, like any other policy area, needs to learn 
and evolve. 
 
11Strengthening the EU ETS. Published 2012. 
Q1
2008 2009 2010 2011
Q2 Q2 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q2 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q2 Q4 Q1 Q1Q2 Q2 Q4
30 €/t
20 €/t
10 €/t
CER
EUA
Putting a cap on price and carbon
The EU ETS aims to control emissions from both power 
generation, district heating (above a certain size) and 
a number of energy intensive industries. It covers over 
11,500 installations across 30 countries (the EU plus 
Norway, Lichtenstein & Iceland). Emissions from these 
installations account for over 40% of total emissions  
in these countries. 
The underlying theory is well developed, that 
establishing a cap on emissions combined with a 
market in trading emission allowances will establish  
a carbon price that settles at the lowest possible level 
given the overall cap, and thus allow the greatest 
emission reductions at least cost. Industry has total 
flexibility over how best to deliver the cap. An important 
element is that the EU ETS was designed for sequential 
phases, and the theory was that allowing banking of 
allowances between phases (from Phase II onwards) 
would help to stabilize the price and provide a longer 
perspective for investment. 
Source: Point Carbon 2012
PART 1: EU ETS ObjECTIVES AND EVOLUTION
Phase I of the ETS, from 2005 to 2007, was explicitly 
a learning phase, without such banking; after a year 
of prices close to €30/tCO2, the price collapsed as 
it became evident that there was a large surplus of 
allowances in the market. Against this experience, the 
Commission acted to strengthen many of the National 
Allocation Plans submitted for Phase II, thus creating 
an expectation of a better balance between supply and 
demand. Also, it was assumed that banking between 
Phases II and III (2013-2020) would help to stabilise the 
price. Prices reached a peak of over €30/tCO2 in July  
2008, fell to around €15/tCO2 in 2009.
The major decisions on Europe’s 2020 goals, and the 
design of ETS Phase III taken in 2008-9, appeared to 
stabilise the system. The Commission’s 2009 analysis 
estimated that the decision would imply carbon prices 
rising close to €40/tCO2 by 2020, and independent 
studies estimated a wide range around this. Some of 
these studies expressed continuing concern about the 
potential for long-term surplus if the EU delivered on its 
combined goals of additional energy efficiency and a 
significant expansion of renewable energy generation, 
combined with the potential scale of international 
credits (see next section). In practice, prices stabilized 
around €15/tCO2 for over two years (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: EU Allowance (EUA, upper) and CDM certificate (CER, lower) prices over Phase 2 (Jan 2008-Feb 2012)
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In late 2011 allowance prices began to fall again: the 
price reached €7/tCO2 in mid-December 2011, with 
an average of €9/tCO2 during the last quarter of 2011. 
It is now clear there is large surplus from Phase II 
that will be banked forward into Phase III, with an 
overall surplus projected to continue out to 2020 (as 
illustrated in the next section). Prices in 2012 (to date) 
have broadly fluctuated in response to perceptions 
about the political willingness of the EU to intervene.
To address various problems identified in Phases I and 
II, proposals were put forward for Phase III to include 
a centralised cap, with the majority of allowances 
auctioned (mainly to the power sector, which accounts 
for well over half the total emissions covered by the 
ETS). These proposals were formally adopted in the 
revised EU ETS Directive adopted in December 2009. 
The EU ETS cap was set so that emissions from EU 
ETS sectors would be 21% lower in 2020 than in 2005, 
with the cap declining 1.74% every year 2013-20; 
this trajectory would continue each year after 2020 
unless altered by a further change to the Directive. 
Various other provisions addressed revenue recycling, 
differentiation between EU-15 and the new Member 
States, and principles around treatment of sectors ‘at 
risk of carbon leakage’.2  
The major frameworks around centralized target-setting 
and carbon leakage in Phase III of the EU ETS are 
established. As the EU enters the last year of Phase II, 
and against a backdrop of continued uncertainty in the 
wider economy, the obvious need is to assess whether 
the EU ETS is delivering its objectives, and what issues 
need to be reassessed as the EU moves towards the 
eight-year period of Phase III of the EU ETS. 
2 In the EU-15 (member states which joined before 2004), all allowances for some sectors, notably the power sector, will be auctioned in Phase 
III. Twelve per cent of the total auction revenue will be given to EU-12 countries (member states which joined in 2004 or 2007) whose emissions 
are lower than required by their Kyoto targets. EU-12 states are permitted to continue giving free allowances to power generators, though the 
free allocations must be phased out during Phase III. So, for example, the Polish government plans to give 70% of allowances free to 188 power 
installations from 2013. Fifty of these are new plants. This would constitute a total of 78 million tonnes of CO2, declining to 32.3 million tonnes 
in 2019 and zero in 2020. 
Sectors are considered to be at risk of carbon leakage if they are energy intensive and highly traded. These sectors will continue to receive 
allowances free, though at a declining rate. The number of free allowances will be set against a benchmark, taking account of the best 
performing (in emissions terms) companies in that sector. The number of free allowances will decrease over time. The sectors currently 
classified as being at risk include aluminium, cement, chemicals, iron and steel. This will help energy intensive companies with high on-site 
emissions, for example due to fuel used to provide heat. But it will not help companies that are electricity-intensive, because such off-site 
emissions are not covered by free allowances. 
ETS objectives
The EU ETS is the primary instrument for reducing 
emissions in European energy and related industries, 
and helping to deliver the EU’s international 
commitments. To achieve this, it embodies more 
specific primary and secondary objectives:
The primary objectives of the EU ETS can be 
characterised as:
i. To reduce GHG emissions efficiently, at a 
negotiated balance of cost and environmental gain;
ii. To promote low carbon corporate investment, by 
providing a price signal that enhances the economic 
viability of energy efficiency, renewable energy and 
other low-carbon energy sources, as cost-effectively 
as possible.
The secondary objectives of the EU ETS include:
iii. To contribute to the EU’s international 
commitments in assisting developing countries (e.g. 
through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM));
iv. To raise revenue, some of which could be used 
to support low carbon innovation and/or energy 
efficiency programmes.
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i) Reducing GHG emissions
There is evidence that the EU ETS has contributed 
to GHG emission reductions in Europe since 2005, 
particularly through fuel switching in the power sector 
and some industrial process improvements (most 
notably in cement). Other factors have also contributed, 
including reduced economic activity (recessionary 
effects), the impact of energy efficiency standards  
and targets, and the promotion of additional renewable 
energy generation. 
As a result, the balance between cost and 
environmental gain is now very different to that 
envisaged just a few years ago. The cost of achieving 
the Phase II emissions target, and also the 2020 
targets originally agreed in March 2008, is now 
much lower than expected (as emphasized in recent 
Commission documents). Moreover, the EU and most 
Member States have adopted a wide range of additional 
measures that seek to address at least two other 
generic dimensions of climate and energy policy: 
•	 Removing barriers and other ways of improving 
energy efficiency, which carries multiple benefits. 
There is long-standing evidence of numerous 
market failures, and even in business sectors 
(most relevant to the EU ETS) surveys suggest that 
most companies are motivated to make energy 
savings only where there is a short pay-back period 
(typically two or three years) (Martin et al, 2011). 
Enhancing energy efficiency is thus a priority target 
for climate and energy policy.
•	 Policy around infrastructure and innovation 
required to support a low carbon economy. These 
range from planning decisions to public funding  
of infrastructure (e.g. rail and power transmission) 
and the EU’s Strategic Energy Technology Plan. 
The crucial role of such complementary measures has 
become clearer over time: they assume an even greater 
significance in times of economic difficulty, and when 
carbon prices (or expectations for long-term rising 
prices) are low. An important issue is therefore how  
the different instruments interact. Debate over the 
Energy Efficiency Directive has highlighted tensions 
arising from the concern that improving energy 
efficiency (indeed, all specific near-term measures 
that reduce energy use) may not actually reduce EU 
emissions, but instead reduce the allowance price 
faced by everyone in the system. 
The ETS has cut emissions, by amounts variously 
estimated to be in the range 30-70 MtCO2/y average 
to date, and will continue to do so to some degree.3  
However, the clear original intent and expectation was 
that the cap would be binding, accelerating emission 
reductions and driving a significant carbon price.  
This is no longer the case.
ii) Low carbon investment
A crucial issue is the extent to which the EU ETS fosters 
low carbon investment. New renewable energy capacity 
is a significant component of this investment, and the 
EU has adopted the binding renewables Directive to 
promote renewables. 
Some renewable energy schemes (e.g. onshore wind, 
biomass) are only marginally more expensive than 
new coal or gas plants, so a low carbon price may 
be enough to attract investment into these schemes. 
However, a low carbon price may not be sufficient  
to make new renewable capacity economically 
preferable to existing fossil fuel plant, where the  
capital investment has already been made and only  
the energy cost is relevant. Other renewable sources, 
notably offshore wind and solar PV, are significantly 
more expensive. 
The investment issue is central because Europe has 
huge investment needs in the energy sector, potentially 
on the order of €1,000bn over this decade.4 The EU 
Energy Roadmap notes that “the EU’s energy system 
needs high levels of investment even in the absence of 
ambitious decarbonisation efforts... scenarios indicate 
that modernizing the energy system will bring high 
levels of investment into the European economy.”
In practice, the EU ETS has so-far provided little 
clarity for investment decision making. Low allowance 
prices, combined with periodic instability, mean that 
the EU ETS has had limited impact on low-carbon 
investment.5 With reference to both energy and carbon 
prices, the EU Energy Roadmap notes that “the current 
uncertainty in the market increases the cost of capital 
for low-carbon investment.”
Given the huge need for increased investment, at  
a time when EU governments have vsignificant budget 
constraints, a crucial criteria for European climate 
policy will be its ability to attract large scale private 
investment. This is also a challenge for European 
policy overall. An important question will thus be 
whether EU climate policy can help to stabilize investor 
expectations so as to attract energy sector investment. 
If it can, it has a good chance not only of delivering 
European emissions reductions, but also supporting 
investment in the European energy sector, and through 
this the wider economy. 
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iii) Supporting international commitments 
In terms of the secondary objectives, the ability 
of organisations to surrender Certified Emissions 
Reductions generated under the CDM (instead of EU 
ETS allowances) has generated significant international 
trading volumes in CDM emissions certificates. 
This has been beneficial for low carbon investments 
receiving CDM revenues but, as with ‘complementary 
measures’, CDM offset projects reduce demand for  
EU ETS allowances and so lower their price. 
The design for Phase III already substantially restricts 
the role of the CDM, partly due to earlier fears that 
large volumes of credits would undermine the EU 
ETS price. EU ETS prices have declined anyway, and 
are now at such low levels that the practical financial 
support for low carbon investment in developing 
countries at the present price is negligible. Prices  
for CDM credits have sunk below €5/tCO2, a level  
that does not provide significant support to most 
emission reducing investments (see Part 3 below).
3 Despite ‘with hindsight’ surplus, the ETS has cut emissions because it has had a positive price (and also affected perceptions), irrespective of 
realized surplus. It is intrinsically complex to estimate the actual degree to which the EU ETS itself has cut emissions,  
as it requires some way of constructing what might have happened without it. A review of published estimates suggests average  
savings since its establishment in the range 30-70MtCO2/y, roughly 2-4% of the total emissions covered (Source: M.Grubb, T.Laing,  
M.Sato & C.Comberti, Analyses of the effectiveness of trading in EU-ETS. Climate Strategies, forthcoming (2012)).
4 The most widely cited estimate for the UK electricity and gas sectors alone is around €200bn to 2020 (Ofgem 2009; HMG Energy White Paper 
on Energy Market Reform, 2011). The EU Energy Roadmap refers to the need for a new generation of investment but  
does not itself appear to give projections. 
5 The level of price required to help drive lower carbon investments of course varies with sector and technology. For example in the 
manufacturing sector, Martin et al (2011) conducted a survey of almost 800 manufacturing companies across six European countries. The 
interviews revealed that allowance prices would be highly relevant to investment decisions at prices in the region of €40/tCO2. Obviously, it is 
not ‘all or nothing’, but this does indicate that a price of €10/tCO2 or lower will mean that the ETS has little impact on investment decisions, and 
might also lead to wider lack of confidence in EU climate policies. However, the interviews and the broader study emphasised that many factors 
influence investment beyond price alone, most notably the strategic credibility and predictability of the policy framework.
iv) Revenue generation 
The potential for revenue generation from auctioning 
was not a major part of early ETS discussions, but 
has become increasingly relevant. Little revenue has 
been raised for European governments to-date, mainly 
because of the high level of free allocation in Phases I 
and II of the scheme. However, the revenue implications 
of the EU ETS become much more relevant in Phase III 
given the move to auctioning, particularly in the power 
sector.
The EU ETS Directive states that member-states should 
spend at least half of the auction revenues from the 
scheme on low carbon innovation and climate change 
adaptation. Some of the anticipated future revenue has 
been allocated to European programmes, notably the 
New Entrants Reserve 300 (NER 300), under which 
the revenue from 300 million allowances will be spent 
on new renewables and Carbon Capture and Storage. 
The proportion of total EU ETS revenue allocated to 
low-carbon investment through the NER 300 scheme is 
only a few percent of total revenue; most of the revenue 
will be available to governments for other spending, 
including deficit or tax reduction. Apart from this, 
European institutions have little real influence over 
how auction revenue is spent. Yet, as indicated above, 
Europe requires major energy-related investment in the 
years and decades to come.
To understand the prospects for the EU ETS in its 
present form fulfilling these various roles, we first  
need to understand the evolution of the ETS price  
and influences upon it.
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Figure 2: Influences on demand for EU ETS before recessionary impacts
Note: Figure 2a shows the impact of various factors upon total EU emissions in 2020 as projected in a 2009 report.  
This underlines the impact of many factors, including the large influence of assumptions around economic growth, structural change, 
capital stock turnover, as well as ‘complementary measures’ on energy efficiency and renewables. One factor not considered was the 
implication of fossil fuel build and price uncertainties (e.g. relative coal-gas prices and different power plant construction scenarios).  
Figure 2b shows the trend implications for EU ETS sector emissions, for a buisness as usual scenario including policies on energy 
efficiency, renewables and CDM.
Source: Carbon Trust (2009), Cutting Carbon in Europe: the 2020 plans and the future of the EU ETS, Charts 4 & 5a.
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Note: Figure 3 shows the volume of surplus allowances over time. With emissions much lower than allocations during Phase II  
(2008-12) the overall surplus (upper line) has grown rapidly; Phase II will end with 2.5-3 billion tonnes surplus to be banked forward  
to Phase III. However, the power sector has been ‘hedging’ its future position by accumulating allowances so as not to depend on future 
auctions. The shaded area shows the amounts respectively for ‘hedging’ coal (upper boundary of green area) or gas (lower boundary  
of green area). Projections (2012 onwards) are based on a ‘reference emissions scenario’.
Figure 3: Accumulation of allowance surplus. Source: Neuhoff et al (2012)
Understanding ETS price evolution  
and prospects
A common view is that allowance prices under the  
EU ETS would have risen towards levels projected  
by the European Commission (around €40/tCO2) but 
for the impact of the European recession which has 
reduced the underlying demand for allowances. While 
the recession has clearly played an important part in 
driving allowance prices down, there have been many 
other factors. Almost all emissions target and trading 
schemes, including the original USA SO2 scheme,  
UK targets for energy intensive emissions and its 
domestic scheme, the USA Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, and Phase I of the EU ETS, have seen similar 
patterns of ‘boom and bust’. The underlying reasons 
for the boom-bust patterns in these schemes are 
unrelated to recession (e.g. Grubb, 2006). 
More specifically, deep uncertainties existed 
irrespective of economic growth rates. Figure 
2a illustrates the many influences on emissions 
volumes within the EU ETS: this analysis suggests 
that high allowance prices could only be possible 
if it was assumed that the EU did not achieve its 
complementary objectives on energy efficiency  
and/or renewables. 
More fundamentally, there existed significant 
uncertainty about the likely demand for allowances, 
and hence the likely price range for allowances under 
the EU ETS. A 2009 study (Carbon Trust, 2009 p.31) 
stated: “Industry, in other words, has certainty about 
the existence of the EU ETS post 2012 – but not 
the price, which based on present evidence could 
be anywhere in the range €15-50/tCO2 – or even 
conceivably outside this range”
The Commission’s initial projections of the carbon 
price under the package rising to €39/tCO2 by 2020 
were in 2010 revised down to a range of €17-25/tCO2. 
The sustained trading price of around €15/tCO2 was 
not inconsistent with this expectation, allowing for 
discounting. However, with emission trends since 2008 
declining well below the trend in Figure 2(b), and the 
growing impact of economic contraction in Europe on 
emissions, it is surprising that allowance prices held  
up as long as they did. 
The likely explanation for this set out in Figure 3,  
which shows that at the same time as the surplus  
was growing, there was growing demand from EU 
power producers building up a bank of allowances 
(hedging) to ensure that they held allowances sufficient 
to cover expected future generation as the system 
moves towards full auctioning in the power sector. 
Power producers did not want to run any risk of getting 
‘caught short’ at future auctions, and this concern  
has supported allowance prices until recently. 
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Quantity, price and revenue implications
An earlier Climate Strategies study (Cooper et al., 2011) 
analysed the potential revenues arising from auctioning 
in Phase III, and estimated that the prices projected by 
the European Commission in 2010 (ie. after downward 
revision for the credit crunch) would imply EU-wide 
revenues of €150-180bn total by 2020. It was also 
noted that strengthening the EU ETS could increase 
revenues substantially, perhaps up to €300bn by 2020. 
In practice, far from doubling potential revenues, 
recent developments in the EU ETS market have  
more than halved likely revenues. Deutsche Bank 
(2011) has predicted that allowance prices will remain 
below €10/tCO2 throughout Phase III unless the EU ETS 
is strengthened; separately, UBS (2011) has predicted 
a €3/tCO2 allowance price. Should allowances remain 
below €10/tCO2, revenues could fall to little over €50bn 
over Phase III of the EU ETS. 
To give a sense of the potential revenue implications  
of measures to restore a higher carbon price, this 
analysis has been repeated for a case in which the 
carbon price is restored to €15/tCO2 in 2013 and  
rises by €1/tCO2 per year out to 2020. This is 
consistent with the Commission’s 2010 projections 
(made after the 2008-9 recession), and is considerably 
lower than the original expectations. The results for  
EU auction revenues by year are shown in Figure 4(a), 
and cumulative total with distribution between some  
of the major countries is shown in figure 4(b)6.  
If the EUA price was €15/tCO2 in 2013, rising linearly 
to meet the price levels expected in Commission 
scenarios (€17-25/tCO2 by 2020) the total revenue 
generated would be €150-190 billion over the eight 
year period, with the range due to different possible 
approaches to free allocations and benchmarking.  
If the EU moved to a 30% GHG reduction commitment 
by 2020, and consequently reduced the ETS cap from 
-21% (against 2005) to -34%, revenue could increase to 
€200-310 billion.
This hedging activity helped to keep the system in 
balance, even as a surplus was accumulating. Despite 
the Commission’s success in limiting Member States’ 
initially generous allocations for Phase II, the period 
2008-12 will end with a large volume of unused 
emission allowances. This Phase II surplus can  
be banked forward into Phase III. 
Given this, most analyses now suggest that the 
system will be in surplus to 2020. A Commission Staff 
Working Paper in January 2012 states that this surplus 
“potentially represent[s] the equivalent of 2.4 billion 
allowances by 2020” (European Commission, 2012). 
Understanding this situation, and its fundamental 
drivers, has two important implications: 
1. Low allowance prices are not a temporary 
phenonomenon. These prices reflect a fundamental 
shift in the EU ETS market, where allowances under 
the cap (including banked allowances) exceed both 
the need for short-term ‘hedging’ in the power 
sector and the expected demand out to 2020  
As a result, unless there is some intervention,  
the EU ETS as currently designed is unlikely to  
be a significant driver of low carbon measures 
during the rest of the decade. The resulting 
low allowance prices through to 2020 would be 
inconsistent with all the EU’s efforts on the EU 
roadmap, and internationally.
2. A less well recognised implication, is that  
the surplus of allowances is not only due to the 
recession. The surplus and the resulting low price 
for allowances, was always a plausible outcome 
given that the original negotiations did not take 
adequate account of uncertainty in macroeconomic 
ditions, relative fuel prices, or the influence of 
Europe’s of complementary targets on energy 
efficiency and renewable energy. It follows that 
simply removing a number of allowances estimated 
to ‘compensate’ for the recession may well not 
address the fundamental issues of intrinsic 
uncertainty and the tension between different 
instruments. 
That mainstream projections out to 2020 have been 
proved so wrong in the space of just three years, and that 
this is not in any way a new pattern for cap-and-trade 
systems, is fundamental in considering how to respond.
6 The amount of free allowances to be given out by the EU-12 countries has not yet been finalised; this modelling assumes 70% free allocation in 
2013, declining to zero in 2020. 
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Figure 4: Revenue implications of an EU ETS allowance price of €15/tC02 in 2013, rising to €22/tC02 in 2020
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*Note: See the caveats in text concerning indirect effects, and source: Climate Strategies:  
Cooper and Grubb (2011) for details of the calculation methods and alternate scenarios
Table 2: Gross auction revenues in key countries, 2013 and 2020*
Figure 5: Schematic of direct revenue and price implications of withdrawing allowances  
(e.g. through set aside or an auction reserve price) 
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Germany, as the highest emitter, would receive the 
highest proportion of additional revenue, even after  
the redistribution of 12% of the auction revenues to 
newer member-states. Revenues to eastern Europe, 
assuming that their power sectors receive the maximum 
allowable free allocation, would rise rapidly as this 
free allocation declines over time; cumulative revenues 
to Poland, Spain and the UK would each exceed €10 
billion, and Greece would receive around €8 bn. 
The overall revenue implications of possible 
interventions are more complex than this suggests. 
Any measure that raises prices implies that fewer 
allowances enter the market. It is almost certain 
that this would result in fewer allowances being 
auctioned; however, the exact impact would depend 
upon whether the measures also reduced the volume 
of free allowances. Raising more revenue by selling 
few allowances may sound counterintuitive but is 
in fact entirely consistent, because there is a steep 
relationship between price and volume. Figure 5 
shows an example in which withholding 100MtCO2/y 
allowances (about 6% of allowances) doubles the price 
from €10/tCO2 to €20/tCO2, and increases the overall 
value of allowances sold by around 80%.7
A deeper reason for questioning whether intervening to 
raise the carbon price might raise less overall revenue 
is if it has an adverse impact on economic growth, and 
hence on tax revenues. This is a complex debate, and 
most analysis on this topic assumes that the European 
economy is in an ‘optimal’ state upon which carbon 
prices impose a burden. Yet the EU economy is a 
very long way from optimal; it has huge unemployed 
resources (notably labour) and an unstable economic 
climate for investment. Other studies suggest a 
contrary conclusion: that by utilising these resources 
better (e.g. construction labour targeted to improve 
buildings energy efficiency), and stimulating greater 
investment and innovation through a combination of 
stabilising expectations and targeted use of revenues,  
a well-designed climate policy has the potential to 
boost economic growth (e.g. PIK, 2011). 
Between these polar opposite views of the potential 
macroeconomic impacts of climate policy lies the 
opportunity for well designed response that will 
increase stability for EU energy sector investment. 
Such policy is likely to generate significantly more 
revenue under the ETS than is at risk from any indirect, 
secondary effects (which could be a mix of positive 
and negative). . If so, the direct revenue calculations 
given here provide a useful indication of the scale 
of impact. At a time of serious fiscal stress, the EU 
has lost an estimated €100bn from auction revenues 
compared to prior expectations: the fiscal implications 
of restoring prices closer to expectations would clearly 
be significant. 
Any intervention will raise additional concerns and 
objections. For example, action that raises allowance 
prices will reignite debate about impact on the EU’s 
industrial sectors, both in terms of ‘carbon leakage’ 
abroad and in relation to the windfall profit implications 
of free allocations. The Phase III rules on carbon 
leakage were negotiated with prices in mind far higher 
than those in the current market: the irony now is  
that with reduced industrial output, higher carbon 
prices would increase the value of the surplus held  
by most industrial sectors and increase the near-term 
profitability of these sectors. 
Ultimately, emissions (or any other) pricing has 
potential distributional consequences: intervention in 
the market will stimulate these debates, irrespective 
of the mechanism of intervention. However, it remains 
that the EU ETS at present is not delivering on some of 
its key objectives, and in this context it makes sense to 
consider options for intervention.
 
7 The report annex (available online) presents some estimates which take account of the number of allowances withheld under various 
scenarios, and confirms that this does not change the fundamental message.
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PART 2: OPTIONS FOR INTERVENTION
The preceding section has outlined the case for strengthening the EU ETS.  
We now consider the specific options. 
Developing a post 2020 framework
Before considering specific near-term interventions, a crucial contextual factor is the need 
of many sectors for longer term clarity. Large energy and industrial sector investments 
have lifetimes of decades, and may indeed take many years to move from conception to 
operation. An earlier study by Climate Strategies and IDDRI on ‘Strengthening the European 
Union Climate and Energy Package’ underlined that for the purpose of investment in these 
sectors, there would be limited value in changing the 2020 targets unless this was set in  
a far clearer vision beyond 2020 – preferably to at least 2030. Increasing numbers  
of companies are also calling for longer term commitments.8  
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Importantly, our earlier study emphasised that post-
2020 negotiations needs to be about far more than 
just a 2030 emissions target. The complexity of 
investment processes, the different lifetimes and 
lead times associated with different types of capital 
stock, and differences in many other factors like 
competitive positioning, risk profiles, and dependence 
on infrastructure and planning procedures, all informed 
a recommendation that the EU should initiate as soon 
as possible processes to develop clearer structural and 
sectoral policies to 2030. A stronger EU ETS cap for 
2030 was one, but far from the only, recommendation.
The EU Roadmap processes start to address this need, 
particularly for the power sector, and offer a foundation 
for what needs to be developed into a political process 
as soon as possible. There are, however, two reasons 
why this cannot substitute for nearer-term action on  
the EU ETS.
One reason is the likely scepticism and short-termism 
of many actors in the system. A 2030 GHG target might 
increase confidence about the future role of the ETS. 
This could provide a framework useful for strategic 
planning. However, given the current state of financial 
markets and market attitude to political risk, a 2030 
target alone would have only a limited impact on the 
current price (due to high discounting in financial 
markets, which would have limited confidence that 
a 2030 target would remain unchanged for the next 
18 years). The continuing financial turmoil in Europe 
has reinforced the short-term focus of many financial 
players, and industries too have to meet demands for 
shareholder value. The analysis by Neuhoff et al (2012) 
suggests that financial players in the EU ETS have 
discount rates typically approaching 15%/y: given this, 
even confident price expectations above €30/tCO2 for 
2020 (e.g. reflecting belief in strong post 2020 targets) 
could still leave present prices languishing. 
8 For example Eneco (the Netherlands), Dong Energy (Denmark) and SSE (United Kingdom), called in late 2011 for binding 2030 targets on 
carbon reductions, renewables and energy efficiency. 
 9 A legislated Phase IV ETS cap would send a stronger signal to markets, but the process of analytics, negotiation and legislation would be 
subject to all the delays indicated; it might be logically hard for the EU agree a Phase IV cap in advance of a longer term target or the outcome 
of the 2015 global target. Moreover, there is paradox in the current situation: if no action is taken, the continuing low price will reinforce the 
perceived risks around Phase IV prices; alternatively, if action is taken without extremely clear rationales and principles, it will increase the 
perceived risk of interventions to Phase IV.
The study by Neuhoff et al suggests that if the system 
can adjust volumes to within the ‘hedging corridor’ of 
power companies, this should introduce much stronger 
influence from players with lower discount rates and 
longer time horizons. Yet given the evolution of carbon 
prices to date, and the fragile politics of climate change 
at present, it remains unclear to what extent power 
companies would hold allowances today, or pay in the 
market, on the basis of political promises about post 
2020 goals.9 The EU ETS is suffering from declining 
credibility.
A second factor is the inevitable complexity of the 
process. Negotiating a 2030 target will be difficult 
enough, and may be linked strongly to progress 
in international negotiations the 2015 deadline 
established by the Durban Platform is an obvious 
focus. The difficulty and importance of the issues 
means that work on this needs already to be pursued, 
but in the current political climate it may be hard to 
finalise a 2030 goal, or even a Phase IV cap, before 
2015: it could then take some time beyond that to 
reach the legislative books (see footnote 8). Solutions 
to the current malaise cannot credibly wait that long. 
It is important to maintain momentum, to build 
upon the EU Roadmaps and turn them into political 
processes that can start to clarify frameworks and 
commitments to 2030. However, this should not be a 
substitute for solving the present problems in the EU 
ETS. Moreover, the continuation of low allowance prices 
could itself undermine the efforts to strengthen post 
2020 frameworks, since industry would in particular 
be keenly aware of the disjuncture between the present 
reality and future aspirations.
Negotiations on post-2020 commitments have a 
complex agenda which also needs to learn from history 
and provide a more robust system. This process cannot 
be rushed as a fix to the present price. As a result, 
addition action is needed for the present situation of 
surplus out to 2020 to be addressed. There are a range 
of options for intervention, which can be divided into 
two categories: 
•	 Quantity measures which focus on reducing the 
number of emission allowances 
•	 Price measures which focus on reducing the price 
risk, either in the market or available to specific 
investors 
We consider each in turn, against the two primary and 
two secondary objectives indicated in Part 1, and also 
crucial issues around delivery. The overall assessment 
is summarised in Table ES-1. 
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Strengthening the ETS by reducing allowances
Most of the current debate about how to strengthen the EU ETS focuses on reducing  
the number of allowances available. This could be done in three main ways.
1) Tightening the greenhouse gas 
reduction target
The EU has indicated that it would increase the 2020 
GHG reduction target from 20% to 30% below 1990 
levels if there were comparable commitments from 
other major emitters. The Durban agreement can be 
interpreted as a commitment in principle to reach such 
an agreement, but no specific commitments beyond 
the set of non-binding Copenhagen-Cancun statements 
appear likely before 2015 at the earliest. 
The EU could increase its target without comparable 
commitments, but the politics of this appear difficult. 
There were efforts to do this after the Cancun 
conference; however, consensus over a draft Council 
conclusion to increase the EU’s GHG emissions 
reduction target to 25% below 1990 levels by 2020 
was not achieved (principally due to concerns from 
Eastern European members, including Poland, over the 
role of coal in electricity generation). At the same time, 
other EU governments have argued that the EU’s GHG 
reduction target should be tightened to 30% below 1990 
levels by 2020. A tighter GHG target could be linked 
to the Durban agreement and a second commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol: the EU has said that it will 
table its proposal on this on 1 May 2012.10  
Such political judgements are ultimately the preserve 
of government, not research, but there is also a 
legal dimension. A GHG target can be set through a 
European Council and Parliamentary procedure: the 
2020 GHG target could be tightened (or a 2030 target 
set), without having to negotiate or re-negotiate an 
entire Directive. However, it could only have a direct 
impact on the EU ETS market if it were also translated 
into tightening the cap on the EU ETS itself, which is 
written into the Directive. 
2) Tightening the ETS cap/trajectory
A second option is to directly amend the ETS cap, 
without negotiating change to the whole-of-economy 
2020 target. Tightening the cap, and in particular 
he trajectory, is a conceptually simple measure that 
would lift the price, though as discussed below it 
would be hard to judge the actual price effects. To limit 
uncertainties for market participants, a clear rationale 
for re-visiting the cap would be needed: the economic 
recession, and that the current trajectory appears 
clearly inadequate compared to the EU’s mid-Century 
goal, could provide a clear rationale.
However, establishing agreement over the new cap 
would appear to be a complex process (similar to 
the original cap-setting process). The current EU 
ETS cap (21% reduction in 2020 relative to 2005) 
is based on an annual linear reduction of 1.74%, 
derived from extensive economic analysis and political 
debate around the 2020 target, much of which is now 
outdated. 
The EU could increase this downward trajectory, 
as the Commission suggested in March 2011. The 
Environment Committee of the European Parliament 
tabled an amendment to the draft Energy Efficiency 
Directive (EED) to increase the trajectory to 2.25%/y, 
which was later changed to a requirement for the 
Commission to make proposals for a tougher ETS cap 
soon after the EED enters into force. However, the 
timing of the EED’s entry into force is not certain. 
Proposals to strengthen the ETS cap/trajectory have 
strong support from some environmental groups, 
particularly since it would set a longer term trajectory 
more consistent with the mid-Century goals.11  Since 
it would not immediately remove the present surplus, 
the impact on the price would depend on the extent 
to which the market players would look ahead to the 
rising value of carbon constraints over the longer term, 
which is particularly hard to judge (see discussion on 
the different discount rates of different actors in the 
system noted above). 
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10 That only one Member (Poland) has openly opposed the draft Council conclusion in summer 2011 suggests that a Commission proposal 
might be accepted by the Council under Qualified Majority Voting. However, Poland is not alone in its concerns about impact of the EU ETS 
target on emissions intensive industry. 
 
11 WWF estimate that reducing ETS emissions by 2.25% a year would cancel more than 8.5 billion allowances by 2050 compared  
to the present trajectory, and bring the trajectory to be consistent with the EU’s target for GHG reductions by 2050.
12 The EU ETS Directive does say that “the Commission shall review the linear factor and submit a proposal, where appropriate,  
to the European Parliament and to the Council as from 2020, with a view to the adoption of a decision by 2025”. So an increase  
in the downward trajectory after 2020 would be consistent with the Directive, but not one before then. 
The ETS Directive, in its revised 2009 form, states that 
“emission allowances allocated in respect of [covered] 
installations should be 21% below their 2005 emission 
levels by 2020” and that “the annual decrease of 
allowances should be equal to 1.74%”. It does not say 
“at least 21% below” or “at least 1.74%”. The words 
‘at least’ appear before the reference to a 20% GHG 
reduction by 2020, but as this target is not set by 
the ETS Directive it can be tightened through other 
policy developments. But the ETS cap and the annual 
reduction are set by the ETS directive, and specific 
numbers written into the Directive. So changing the  
cap number would appear to require an amendment  
to the Directive.12  
Amendments to the EED have so far only been tabled by 
the Parliament’s Environment Committee. Although it is 
widely accepted that energy efficiency would lower the 
price of allowances (reduced energy use lower emission, 
and hence demand for allowances), the cap is the 
central measure of the ETS: the argument that it should 
be set under the ETS directive appears hard to resist. 
Tightening could be achieved through a new piece 
of amending legislation. For comparison, the first 
(1996/1998) and second (2003) internal energy  
market Directives in electricity and gas envisaged 
market opening timetables which were much slower 
than those now in place after the third package 
Directives of 2009. These slower timetables were 
simply speeded up by the adoption of each new set 
of Directives. However, in the current EU political 
climate, there is understandable reluctance to re-open 
the ETS Directive: there is a concern that this could, 
counterproductively, risk exacerbating further the 
uncertainties facing EU industry.
Restricting CDM offsets – one means of 
lowering the ETS cap.
Phase III of the ETS allows less use of CDM offsets  
than did Phases I and II. One way to lower the Phase 
III cap in effect would be for future EU legislation, 
including possible measures to tighten the 2020  
cap, to be more restrictive on CDM credits. However, 
ending CDM offsets would undermine the EU’s efforts 
to foster global action. Despite controversies, the  
CDM has channelled substantial amounts of finance  
to support low carbon investment in developing 
countries; this in turn has supported increased 
involvement of developing countries in low carbon 
investment, alongside important diplomatic gains. 
The EU could instead offer direct investment for  
low-carbon projects to developing countries. However, 
the EU is behind schedule in providing additional 
support for the Climate Fund which was agreed at the 
2009 Copenhagen climate summit, and developing 
countries might see an increased risk associated with 
direct support for low-carbon investments (rather than 
support via the CDM). 
Underpinning the CDM was the idea that climate 
change is a global problem in which developing 
countries need to be engaged; at the same time, 
developing countries offer some of the cheapest 
options for reducing emissions. To drive up costs 
in Europe by restricting even further the incentives 
for European companies to invest in emission 
reducing projects abroad, and potentially alienate 
developing countries at the same time, would seem a 
counterproductive response to the present situation.
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3) Setting aside allowances 
A third option is to ‘Set-Aside’ some allowances.  
At least initially, this would have a similar impact to 
lowering the cap, except that the withdrawal would be 
immediate rather than implicit in a tightened trajectory. 
The allowances could be placed in a strategic reserve, 
potentially available to be returned to the system later. 
Set-aside could probably be implemented without  
a revision of the ETS directive, for example through 
a “Committee procedure” (Comitology), on the basis 
of Article 10(4) of the EU ETS Directive. The simplest 
mechanism would involve rescheduling auctions, so 
that fewer allowances were released earlier on in Phase 
III. However, most interpretations suggest that, under 
the Directive, the full allocation of allowances under 
Phase III would still have to be released before the  
end of Phase III. 
There also appears to be a stronger case for setting 
aside allowances through the EED, than would be  
case for a directly lower ETS cap or steeper trajectory. 
The European Parliament’s environment committee 
tabled an amendment to the EED that 1.4 billion 
carbon allowances should be set aside during Phase 
III, and the principle of set-aside was endorsed by the 
EU Parliament whilst specific numbers were removed 
in favour of calling on the Commission to develop a 
specific proposal. 
For these various reasons, set-aside would seem 
quicker to negotiate and implement than a formal 
tightening of the ETS cap. Set-aside under the EED 
could prevent allowance prices falling further (due to 
energy efficiency effects, or a continuing recession), 
and even if it was only linked to energy efficiency, 
could nudge the price upward. The final impact on 
prices would depend on the number of allowances set 
aside and on wider economic conditions, as well as the 
degree of certainty over whether, when and under what 
conditions allowances might be returned to the market. 
Immediate set-aside of allowances could have a greater 
prompt impact on price than other quantity responses. 
However it would also introduce a new element of 
regulatory uncertainty: once the precendent for 
intervention through set-aside has been set, investors 
may be concerned that intervention could occur again 
in the future.  
These risks could be ameliorated, though not entirely 
avoided, by:
1. defining a clear basis for set aside (for example,  
to match progress in energy efficiency); 
2. defining a clear basis for quantification;
3. being clear about what precedent the set-aside 
represented, and the circumstances under which  
it could be repeated;
4. indicating clearly whether and if so under what 
conditions allowances might be returned to the 
market. 
Despite the potential complications, set-aside is  
clearly the ‘front runner’ in terms of options, and  
also has attracted significant corporate support.13 The 
apparent legal need to return allowances to the market 
by the end of Phase III could presumably be addressed 
by specifying the terms under which this could happen, 
by overriding this through the EED Directive, or simply 
by an understanding that if Phase III remains in 
surplus as expected, the cap negotiated for Phase IV 
should automatically be adjusted to absorb the Set-
Aside volume that would be released and immediately 
‘banked’ forward.
Strengthening the EU ETS. Published 2012. 26
13 A group of companies which back a tougher ETS cap published a joint letter with environmental NGOs E3G and Bellona Europe on 19 
December 2011. The full list of signatories to this letter was: Alstom, Dong Energy, Bellona Europe, Climate Markets and Investment 
Association, Shell, SSE, Doosan Power Systems, E3G, Eneco, EWEA, Tyco, Germanwatch, Danish Energy Association, Eurec Agency. The text 
read: ““We support withholding EU ETS allowances because:
•	 It is necessary to maintain the level of ambition agreed in the 2008 energy and climate package, and to incentivize investment in low 
carbon technology development and energy efficiency;
•	 Major structural changes to the current ETS Directive are avoided; 
•	 Energy intensive industry is largely protected from a strengthened carbon price due to the allocation of allowances at no cost and sectors 
are eligible for compensation to cover increased electricity prices; 
•	 An increased carbon price will boost the revenue raising potential from the auctioning of allowances by Member States;
•	 Restoring the carbon price signal will increase the value of the NER 300 which is essential to develop vital innovative renewables and 
Carbon Capture & Storage technologies;
•	 It allows the EU to continue leading the international climate debate, by demonstrating the effectiveness of its domestic regulation and 
promoting the emergence of compatible schemes elsewhere in the world.”
 14 See separate Annex for details
The price impact of Quantity responses
The ETS was not designed to deliver price 
predictability; rather, it was designed to deliver volume 
predictability, with the price decided by the market. 
Major uncertain influences on the price include:
•	 The economy. All economic forecasting is subject 
to uncertainty, and the future economic situation 
in the Euro area is currently extremely uncertain. 
The latest IMF forecast for Euro area GDP growth 
in 2012 is -0.5%, and the level of economic activity 
clearly has an impact on emissions. A previous 
Climate Strategies paper (Bowen 2009) concludes 
that “for a given mix of energy technologies, a 
0.8% reduction in emissions for every 1% reduction 
in GDP does not appear to be an unreasonable 
assumption” over the medium to long term. 
However, the emissions reduction (and hence price 
impact) would be greater in the short term, as 
unexpected economic downturns are initially likely 
to hit more energy-intensive industries harder than 
output as a whole. 
•	 Coal-gas price differential. The difference between 
coal and gas prices does much to determine the 
short to medium term cost of reducing emissions 
in the power sector. Fossil fuel prices have been 
quite volatile over the previous few years, and there 
is no reason to think this will be different in the 
future; forecast gas prices by the end of the decade 
in particular vary by at least a factor of two. 
•	 Other energy-related policies. As noted, both 
renewable energy and energy efficiency policies, by 
contributing to emission reductions, reduce the price 
of CO2 in the EU ETS as it is currently designed.
Some very simple illustrative scenarios suggest that 
even after a set-aside of 1,400MtCO2 (as currently 
proposed), prices could be quite uncertain. A simple 
indicative ‘stress test’ exercise14 groups uncertainties 
in terms of impact on energy demand (economic 
growth rates, energy efficiency policies), and energy 
supply mix (relative energy prices, retirement and 
build rates for gas generation and renewables). By its 
nature, uncertainty is hard to quantify, but it suggests 
that uncertainties in underlying ‘reference’ emission 
levels could approach +/- 1,000MtCO2 over Phase 
III. Translating this into price impacts adds further 
uncertainty, but simplified relationships between 
quantity and price suggest that Phase III average  
prices could then still range from €10/tCO2 to €30/
tCO2, or possibly outside this range, at least unless 
and until a post-2020 agreement clarified the potential 
value of banking allowances. A striking feature of 
most analyses to date has been their lack of detailed 
uncertainty analysis.
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Strengthening the ETS by measures relating directly to price
15 Some economists argue for a carbon tax instead of ETS. This does not enable any minimum guaranteed environmental goal and its efficiency 
depends more heavily on the assumption of an efficient energy market, rather than a broader focus on all the factors that affect emission 
quantities. Also, whilst ETS aids price discovery, a carbon tax would not deliver complementary clarity about the emission reductions achieved, 
which would always be uncertain since they would be an unobservable change from what would have happened otherwise. Moreover the 
empirical evidence (including the EU experience of the 1990s) is that carbon taxes have been far harder to establish than emissions trading, 
and even messier in practice because of the political need to grant various exemptions. In trading systems, free allocation offers an easier route 
to address such political economy factors, whilst firms still retain some incentive to reduce their emissions through the latent carbon price in 
place. Despite the limitations of the EU ETS, establishing a single carbon price across the EU has been a remarkable political and economic 
achievement, now firmly rooted in EU law. There seem no grounds for believing that a carbon tax would be either more effective, or politically 
plausible; hence this report’s focus on how to strengthen the EU ETS.
16 The level of reserve price would obviously have to be negotiated. In our illustration in Part 1 we examined revenue impact of a price starting at 
€15/tCO2, rising at one euro a year until 2020, so reaching €22/tCO2. Many major low carbon investments (particularly those involving CCS or 
offshore engineering) may require prices over €30/tCO2 (so it could logically be argued that a floor price should be set at this level; Henningsen, 
2008). Ultimately of course, any level set would be the outcome of a political process.
17 The UK Energy White Paper (2011) estimated that the certainty provided by its long-term contracts combined with price floor would reduce 
the cost of capital to power sector investors by over 1% per year, saving potentially billions of pounds in the overall cost of investments.
The preceding section has considered a number of approaches to affecting allowance  
prices, with an intended one-off adjustment of quantities. Another approach is to  
consider mechanisms that could intrinsically help to maintain prices in the face of  
uncertain future developments. 
 
 
Given that the core concern over the current EU ETS 
market is about allowance prices too low to deliver 
key objectives, a price-related adjustment mechanism 
would seem to be an attractive approach to improve 
longer-term price confidence for investors. 
The quantity targets of the ETS have an intrinsic value 
in setting the context for corporate strategy, and in 
drawing attention to numerous issues beyond pure 
price (Neuhoff et al, 2011). The ETS cap sets a certain 
pathway of emissions, whilst trading provides a price 
and the system overall enables price discovery. 
However, it is an unusual market in which supply 
is fixed (set by the cap) and unresponsive to price, 
whilst demand is potentially very uncertain; it seems 
a structure with inherent risks of instability (Grubb, 
2009). Moreover, the repeated discovery that it seems 
far cheaper to hit a negotiated quantity than expected, 
a feature now common in most quantity systems to 
date, even long before the EU ETS (Haites, 2005), 
legitimately raises the question of what to do about  
it, in a systematic rather than ad-hoc way. 
Potential answers draw upon now well-established 
economics literature about the value of ‘hybrid’ 
instruments to cope with real-world uncertainties; 
see for example Pizer (2002), as well as Hepburn 
e.a. (2006) and Grubb and Newbery (2008). These 
instruments offer the potential for providing greater 
certainty regarding prices and investment signals, while 
maintaining the advantages of a trading scheme.15  
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4) Reserve Price Auctions (RPA)  
and related automatic adjustments  
for the ETS 
One approach would be to establish that, from the start 
of Phase III, no allowances would be auctioned at below 
a specified price; this level could start fairly modest 
and rise.16 Allowances not taken up at auction could be 
either cancelled or carried forward to future auctions. 
Present free allocations would remain unchanged, 
but their value would increase: prices within the EU 
ETS would rise immediately given the knowledge that 
additional allowances would only enter the system 
if and when the price reaches the level set. Given a 
sufficient volume of auctions, which is the case in 
Phase III, this would de facto result in a floor price: if 
most allowances will only come into the system at a 
price at or above a reserve price, then participants will 
be reluctant to sell allowances below the reserve price. 
Irrespective of the initial level set, establishing a 
rising floor price through a European Reserve Price 
for Auctions (RPA) would give confidence for investors 
regarding a minimum allowance price in the EU ETS. It 
would remove large perceived downside risks, support 
low-carbon investment decisions, and reduce the cost 
of capital, which could result in substantial economic 
savings.17 
It would also ‘protect’ the system not only against 
recession, but would soften the consequences of 
success in energy efficiency and other ‘complementary’ 
policies: if these measures resulted in prices falling 
towards the reserve price, real system-wide emission 
reductions would follow as fewer allowances were 
bought at auctions. 
However, at present the system is so oversupplied that 
an RPA on its own would in effect set the price for many 
years hence. There would be little trading, and the 
quantity value of the system, with its associated upside 
potential for investors, could be fatally undermined. 
This is one reason to consider RPA as a component of 
responses, as discussed in Part 3 of this paper.
A European RPA would avoid the market distortion 
that national price floors (considered below) introduce; 
however, to achieve this, RPAs would need to be 
agreed across all auction platforms. The European 
Commission is already involved in setting the rules for 
the platforms, in response to previous problems with 
fraud.
Under the ETS Directive, the Commission has a 
responsibility to monitor the functioning of the 
European carbon market. Each year, it shall submit a 
report to the European Parliament and to the Council 
on the functioning of the carbon market including 
the implementation of the auctions, liquidity and the 
volumes traded.” The very low carbon price is an 
aspect of the functioning of the carbon market, so the 
Commission could legitimately make RPA proposals 
in its next report. However, implementing RPAs would 
require amendment to the secondary legislation on 
ETS implementation adopted in 2010 via Committee 
procedure: this would require Qualified Majority Voting.
The net effect of an RPA would be to result in 
allowances not entering the market due to the 
minimum price set rather than a central quantity 
decision. Within the terms of the current Directive, 
this would appear to raise the same legal issues as 
a politically-determined quantity of set-aside: what 
happens to any allowances not auctioned, and in 
particular whether and under what terms would the 
allowances be returned to the market? It appears that 
RPA would seem amenable to the same approach as 
under set-aside.
At present there seems limited support for RPA in EU 
institutions, with concerns about potential ‘interfering 
with the market’ being expressed. Yet the attraction of 
RPAs is that they are (or should be) set in advance, in 
which case they represent no more interference in the 
market than any reserve price auction approach (most 
governments set reserve prices on bond auctions, for 
example). In addition, it appears hard to understand 
why quantity mechanisms such as set-aside represent 
less market intervention than RPA approaches, 
particularly when there is little future certainty about 
the volume of set-aside. 
One outcome of this reluctance to consider price-based 
adjustment mechanisms, alongside the demand of 
investors for greater price confidence, seems to be that 
it will drive other forms of price-related measures at 
national levels.
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This, and also the financial exposure such an option 
places on government, in practice reinforces rather 
than substitutes for the need for a price floor across 
the system. Thus, in addition to long-term contracts, 
the UK Energy Market Reform includes a price floor 
set through retrospective tax levels contingent upon 
the EU ETS price.21 This combination increases 
price certainty for investors in the UK, the contracts 
acting to underwrite investors against risks not only 
of EU ETS price fluctuations but also the fact that 
the UK Chancellor can decide to change tax levels at 
any budget. From a Treasury perspective, this has 
an advantage not only in reducing the government 
liability, but it raises revenue from carbon emissions 
without the 12% redistribution to eastern European 
countries required from EU ETS auctions. However, 
a significant downside is that a national price floor 
also introduces competitive distortions within the EU. 
The UK government has responded to this concern 
by offering financial support to energy-intensive 
sectors to compensate them for the price floor, further 
complicating the system. 
Finally, such national measures are unlikely to reduce 
ETS-wide emissions. National measures lead to fewer 
allowances being purchased for use in one country, 
which are then available elsewhere, depressing the  
EU ETS price. 
5) National contracts and price floor(s)
With little support from the European Commission for 
some form of price support18, action could be taken by 
individual Member States in a number of forms. The 
approach which may raise least political resistance is 
to issue specific government-backed contracts to large 
investors. As suggested most recently in a report by 
Bruegel (Zachmann et al) this would involve:
“… bilateral option contracts between public institutions 
and investors. The public institutions would guarantee a 
certain carbon price to an investor. In case the realised 
carbon price is below the guaranteed price, the public 
institution (the option writer) will pay the difference to the 
investor (the option holder). Hence, in case of a low carbon 
price that might be detrimental to the competitiveness 
of a low-carbon investment the investor gets some 
compensation. Thus, the investor’s risk is reduced. At the 
same time, if the public institution issues a large volume 
of option contracts, it creates an incentive not to water 
down future climate policies. Policies that reduce the 
carbon price will have a direct budget impact by increasing 
the value of the outstanding options. This would tend to 
increase the long-term credibility of carbon policies.”
This ‘carbon contracts’ idea has been around for 
several years,19 and now forms a cornerstone of the 
UK’s Energy Market Reform, precisely because of the 
recognition that the EU ETS in its current form cannot 
support the kind of investment required. 
Whilst a potentially useful tool, carbon contracts 
only work for specific, large investors: this approach 
also risks being overly bureaucratic, with some risk 
of regulatory gaming & capture. As a result, it is 
sometimes seen as a fall-back position that could 
reduce the price risk facing large power investors but 
without many other applications, and these factors 
inevitably limit its role.20  
18 Commission officials do not appear to support price support measures. A European Commission spokesman for Climate Action, Isaac Valero 
Ladron, told Reuters in January 2012 that: “The Commission does not support the idea of a price floor. We don’t have a price floor, we will never 
propose a price floor.” (Wynn, 2012).  Climate Action Commissioner Connie Hedegaard, who is responsible for the ETS within the Commission, 
also argued in February 2012 against any intervention in the market (Hedegaard, 2012).
19 See for example Helm (2004), Newbery (2005), Neuhoff and Ismer (2006), Grubb and Newbery (2008) for various expositions, together with 
citations in the Bruegel report (Zachman et al, 2012).
20 Because such contracts would inevitably be negotiated by individual Member States, and would differ, they could also start to open up 
challenges around State Aids, and this has significantly constrained and influenced the UK design.
21 Specifically, the Climate Change Levy (CCL) (which despite its name was an energy tax rather than an emissions tax) is being changed into 
an emissions tax, and applied to fossil fuels used to generate electricity at rates that take account of the average carbon content. These rates 
will be set taking account of the EU ETS price, so will be called the ‘CCL carbon price support rates’. The price floor will begin at £16 (€19.3) in 
2013, rising yearly in a linear fashion to reach £30 (€36.2) in 2020 (Ares, 2011).
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Other approaches and objections
The options considered in this report are not 
exhaustive. For example, one hybrid of national and 
European policies would be if a group of countries 
bought back EU allowances, thereby raising the price 
across Europe. Were a number of large-emissions 
countries within the EU ETS to collaborate on this, their 
own net revenues would also rise alongside price rises 
for allowances across the EU. Indeed, if they agreed a 
target price, it would still set a de facto floor price. 
For a wholly different approach to prompt intervention, 
ClientEarth (2011) proposed that the Commission could 
alter the allowances issued for 2013, thus resetting 
the baseline for the linear reduction for the rest of the 
period. This rather dramatic approach doed not appear 
to have significant support. 
This (and set-aside) reflect in particular concerns about 
the impact of banking allowances forward, particularly 
if the surplus accumulates as has been the case 
(Figure 3). There are many good theoretical reasons 
for banking, but a serious problem is revealed when 
transferring a largely ‘unearned’ surplus to the future 
drastically weakens future ambition. In the present 
situation, this underpins the proposal for set-aside. 
An interesting suggestion to address such concerns 
automatically in trading systems is to ‘cap’ the volume 
of allowances that could be banked forward. Such an 
approach could also be applied within a period from 
year to year to smooth the impact on the market.22  
Another approach is to rely more heavily on a 
combination of banking with sequential target 
negotiations. If targets are negotiated every five years, 
for example, and there are clear institutional guidelines 
around the processes of cap-setting, this provides an 
opportunity to correct for any growing surplus through 
a tighter subsequent cap. This might work for systems 
with no more than 5-year periods, but the move to 
eight years for Phase III of the EU ETS makes for a gap 
which, as indicated at the beginning of Part II of this 
report, precludes this working without unreasonably 
long hiatus. 
Moreover, a significant drawback is that relying on 
experience within one 5-year period to set the next 
5-year cap leaves business (or others) with very 
limited foresight of future caps, other than through 
guessing how the bodies responsible will interpret the 
institutional guidelines. Were such guidelines explicitly 
included future price-related goals, this could provide 
an alternative to reserve price auctions, but the 
advantage is unclear. 
Another suggestion for handling price uncertainty 
has been a Carbon Bank: in 2008, the former British 
Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, suggested creating an 
independent European carbon bank. He suggested 
that this could take over the role of setting the EU ETS 
cap from the Commission and national governments, 
and potentially take an active role to help adjust or 
stabilise the system if needed. More limited roles 
might include involvement in set-aside decisions, or 
allowance buy-back at times of low price. There may 
be a long-term value in this, but the creation of another 
European institution, including all the issues around its 
governance, objective, mandate and powers, does not 
appear achievable in the near term. 
This study has suggested Reserve Price Auctions as 
a mechanism which appears relatively simple, and 
reflects an underlying principle of ‘duality’: handling 
uncertainty through explicit attention to price as well as 
quantity goals. 
22  Erik Haites, personal communication in response to CS online review of the draft of this report: “An alternative on-going solution is to build 
automatic, small adjustments into the rules. If unforeseen circumstances lead to larger reductions than anticipated, part of that reduction is captured as 
an environmental benefit, which after all is the objective of the scheme. Specifically, if the accumulated bank exceeds X% of the annual emissions, the 
number of allowances issued for the next year is reduced by the excess. So if after the compliance determination in April 2012 the bank is (X+2)% of the 
2011 allowance cap, the number of allowances issued for 2013 (2012 allowances have already been issued) is reduced by 2% of the 2011 cap. If the 
bank is smaller than X% of the 2011 emissions, there is no adjustment to the 2013 cap. Adjustments, when they occur, are likely to be small, so they will 
have little effect on the market. And making them automatic means that political decisions, and the associated uncertainty, are avoided.”
In broad concept, a similar approach has been suggested by the Carbon Market Investor Association, proposing that if a certain number of 
surplus permits have not been used after a period of three years, an equal number of permits should be removed from later supply (CMIA 
(2011), as cited in O. Sartor (2012).
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A common objection to many of the measures outlined 
in this report is that they would “interfere with the 
market”. The EU ETS market (in common with other 
systems for regulating ‘externalities’) has been 
constructed by political decision-making: indeed, most 
markets are regulated to mitigate the risks of excessive 
laissez faire. The EU ETS is a means to the objectives 
outlined: the relevant question is whether the system 
is delivering what was intended, and the specific pros 
and cons of options (including impacts on market 
confidence, which of course does risk being eroded by 
almost any intervention). Hence the emphasis of this 
report on being clear about the Objectives, rather than 
a focus on market purity.  
Whilst many stakeholders accept this, particular 
opposition to a price floor seems to stem from  
three concerns. One is a simple misunderstanding:  
that intervention amounts to governments playing 
an on-going, activist role in the market. It does not: 
Reserve Price Auctions can set out terms clearly in 
advance. Another is that it is unduly interventionist, 
with concerns that a ‘floor price’ represents the 
emergence of a ‘managed market’. However, it is 
unclear why a price-based measure is any more 
interventionist than withdrawing allowances: indeed, 
RPAs would set out clearly and transparently the 
conditions under which additional allowances would  
(or not) enter the market. Setting out the rules clearly 
in advance is not ‘interfering with the market’, but 
part of designing the market: this is a feature of other 
markets, with governments setting reserve prices 
on auctions in (for example) bond markets. It seems 
unclear why setting a reserve price in EU ETS auctions  
is more objectionable than in other government-led  
(or private) auctions.
The final concern is that a price floor might be 
accompanied by a price ceiling, which has been 
variously opposed as weakening the level of 
environmental ambition or amplifying concerns about 
a ‘managed market’. Whilst price floors and ceilings 
are logically separate, and are motivated by entirely 
different concerns, it is indeed possible that they 
might be politically linked. The pros and cons of price 
ceilings are beyond the scope of this report, though we 
note that both Australia and California have adopted 
price corridors as illustrated in the final part of this 
report. Again, this speaks to the need to be clear about 
Objectives, and to work from these to consider design 
choices. 
The more generic objection to intervention is that it 
risks ‘changing the rules’ after agreeing Phase III. 
However, the arguments set out in Part 1 do suggest  
a sufficient procedural case for action: 
•	 The original Phase III agreement included intent to 
move to a stronger target in event of an effective 
global deal, which was hoped for at Copenhagen. 
It thus never did provide a fixed set of rules for 
investors but was crafted in the expectation of 
strengthening; that may still occur (in 2015), but 
such a delay will deter investors. As outlined in the 
previous section, global action has not stopped 
but is developing in different ways; the EU ETS is 
no longer the only system, or possibly even the 
strongest system.
•	 The original Phase III deal was itself inconsistent, 
as the combination of complementary targets 
agreed on renewables and energy efficiency, 
together with the volume of emission offsets, would 
have limited the impact of the EU ETS. This raises 
questions over the level of integration of the full 
package of measures. 
•	 The credit crunch and recession can plausibly 
be considered as force majeure, justifying some 
retrospective response. 
The key question is not only whether the EU is ready 
to make the (necessary) recalibration associated with 
a one-off set-aside, but also to explore, systematically 
and pragmatically, enduring solutions to handling 
uncertainty.
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PART 3: POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS  
AND wAYS FORwARD
It is ultimately for politicians and EU institutions to decide on the appropriate responses to 
the current EU ETS market, and they are probably best placed to judge political prospects. 
Nevertheless, some procedural and political aspects associated with each of the five options 
need to be overcome. 
Quantity responses
•	 Tightening the 2020 GHG target faces the 
complexities of its historical legacy, international 
linkages and its coverage of all sectors of the 
economy, and would only directly help the EU ETS 
if it could be linked to tightening the EU ETS cap. 
The EU’s decision to adopt a second Kyoto period 
commitment could, however, be a driver to support 
this response. 
•	 Lowering the ETS cap or increasing the reduction 
trajectory may be problematic given the long-run 
trajectory implications and the need to change the 
EU ETS directive. 
•	 Set-aside, partly linked to energy efficiency 
measures, has the support of the relevant 
European Parliamentary Committees, the Danish 
Council Presidency and significant parts of the 
energy industry, and would not require ETS 
Directive renegotiation. It is the clear front-runner, 
with a clear legal mechanism for implementation.23  
However, it will face the charge that it establishes 
a dangerous precedent of interference in the 
market, and does not provide any enduring price 
confidence for investors: indeed, by setting a 
precedent for intervention, on its own it could 
erode institutional confidence.
Price-based and adaptive responses
•	 An EU Reserve Price on Auctions (RPA) has 
historically been explored least, and faces 
resistance from those committed to the current 
quantity-only approach. However, the EU is 
increasingly alone in this reluctance to embrace a 
reserve price approach: the US RGGI & Californian 
schemes, together with the Australian Carbon 
Price Mechanism, all have minimum price, and 
some parts of industry have suggested RPA 
from Phase IV. The legal issues facing an RPA in 
Phase III appear similar to set-aside, but adopting 
it in the current situation of surplus would 
virtually determine the price, instead of acting in 
appropriate role of ‘reassurance’ to investors by 
underpinning a trading market. 
•	 National responses may be the most likely 
outcome, given the urgent need for investment in 
the EU energy system and the arguments from 
industry for greater certainty. This might build 
into a coalition of countries setting price floors: 
the UK is taking this approach, and France can 
be expected to be in favour given its reliance on 
nuclear power. Spain might also support such an 
approach, as the new government seeks additional 
sources of revenue, while the position of Germany 
is uncertain.24  
23 A likely interpretation of the EU ETS Directive is that decisions on timing of emission allowances released through auctions can be made 
through Committee procedures (not requiring any revisions to the Directive), but that all allowances should be made available by the end of the 
period. However, it may be possible to negotiate the Phase IV cap so as to absorb any ‘intended’ degree of banked allowances associated with 
set-aside.
24 Germany has set out an ambitious ‘energy concept’, with more than 90% of EU ETS auctioning revenues being used for climate measures 
(including energy concept implementation). Should EU ETS revenue be below forecast, this will place budgetary pressure on other areas of 
spending: a price floor, whether at a national or European level, would address this budgetary risk.
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Ways forward
The EU ETS is a central policy for Europe’s climate 
policies and low-carbon transition, yet for a variety of 
reasons explored in this report, the relevance of the 
EU ETS to short and long-term emissions mitigation 
in Europe is being eroded. Action is needed to 
address the limitations of the current EU ETS, and 
set-aside is the support measure that could be agreed 
and implemented most quickly. Set-aside would 
‘recalibrate’ the ETS to take account of the recession 
and continuing weakness of the European economy.
However, embarking on set-aside would not address 
the fundamental design challenge, which is around 
the relationship between quantity and price in an 
uncertain world. Set-aside could even increase the long-
term uncertainty of the EU ETS in investor’s minds. 
While set-aside would increase the price, it would not 
preclude the risk of another price collapse. Would 
European institutions decide at some stage in the 
future that another recalibration was necessary? And 
under what conditions might they return allowances to 
the system? Much would hinge upon the clarity of the 
terms for a set-aside approach to be successful. 
The underlying challenge is set out in Figure 6.  
There are differing objectives – quantity and price – 
with different actors looking over different timescales.  
At present, even the quantity objective is questionable, 
as the surplus from Phase II renders the Phase III cap 
largely redundant. More fundamentally, the relationship 
between quantity and price is, in reality, extremely 
uncertain: almost all caps set to date (in the EU ETS 
and elsewhere) have ended up with prices lower than 
expected, and there remains uncertainty over the real 
impact of price on emissions over different timescales. 
Policy needs to target a zone that gives reasonable 
reassurance to the different actors on these  
differing objectives. 
 
The opposition of some eastern European 
governments to stronger EU action on climate change 
might be mitigated as the revenue implications of a 
very weak price, and/or of national measures by other 
countries, become more apparent. Overall, however, 
the politics of pursuing any change are unlikely 
to be straight-forward. As noted, there are some 
other options that could be considered, but none on 
their own seem obviously preferable, from either a 
technical or political perspective.  
At the time of publication, the procedural situation  
is as follows. The context is set by the negotiation  
of the EU’s Energy Efficiency Directive, on which  
the EU Parliament tabled numerous amendments. 
Following on from broad-ranging proposals from  
the Environment Committee, on 28 February 2012  
the Industry, Transport, Research and Energy 
Committee (ITRE) voted for an amendment which 
would require the Commission, to consider whether 
to take measures, before the start of Phase III. Such 
measures “may include withholding of the necessary 
amount of allowances”.25 The proposal is likely to be 
adopted by the EU Parliament, and this would then go 
to the European Council.
ITRE did not seek to require the Commission to  
set aside allowances, nor did it identify a specific 
number of allowances to be set aside (unlike the 
Environment Committee which had called for 
1,400MtCO2 allowances to be set aside).  
That decision, and the terms under which  
allowances might be held back, would be left  
for the  
Commission to analyse and propose. 
Quite apart from the politics, however, the issue that 
policymakers seem to be facing that no single option 
solves all the core problems. Apart from doing nothing 
– probably the most damaging option of all – perhaps 
the most plausible response is set-aside, combined 
with efforts to accelerate negotiations on 2030 
targets and Phase IV of the EU ETS to give industry 
more strategic direction. However, there remains the 
risk that such negotiations may take a very long time, 
and/or that Europe would stumble into a repeat of 
the kind of problems that have already emerged for 
Phase III (before it has even started). The more Phase 
IV negotiations are accelerated, and the earlier the 
commitments are adopted, the greater the risk of 
getting it wrong, again. 
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Figure 6: Price and Quantity in the EU ETS
Table 3: Illustrated Phase III carbon price sensitivities for different policy states  
Notes: For assumptions see Annex.27 €18.5/tCO2 is average price illustrated in the section on  
‘Quantity, price and revenues implications’ in Part 1 of this report: €15/tCO2 in 2015 rising at 1€/tCO2/year. 
*In cases with an ‘open trading’ price close to the level of Reserve Price Auction, the actual trading price would be higher than 
indicated since the RPA would reduce the downside risk to those buying or holding allowances at the prevailing price. Prices with  
set-aside under “high emissions trend” are particularly sensitive to assumptions about both quantity and the form of price responses  
(note also the modelling assumption that no allowances withdrawn are returned to the market).
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The Figure illustrates trend of  EU ETS prices since 2010, compared to the fixed price followed by 
price corridor in the Australian CPM, and the wider price corridor defined in the Californian ETS. 
There needs to be confidence that set-aside is being 
considered as a once off ‘recalibration’, and the 
most effective approach to doing this would be to 
demonstrate to investors that the ETS will in future be 
more robust. One way to do this would be to link set-
aside with a commitment to Reserve Price Auctions. 
This would be an effective combination of instruments, 
a hybrid approach as recommended in economics 
literature. Under such an approach: 
•	 Set-aside would address a crucial problem of RPAs 
in the current market, being that the market has 
such an over-supply of allowances that an RPA on 
its own would effectively set the price. 
•	 RPAs combined with set-aside would remove the 
need for any future recalibrations, and remove the 
downside risk of deep subsequent price crashes. 
Instead, they would in effect provide bankable 
insurance to reinforce the impact intended from 
set-aside. 
The effect of such a combined approach is illustrated 
by simple, illustrative EU ETS price scenarios  (Table 
3). These results demonstrate the degree to which the 
combination of set-aside and RPA removes downside 
price risk, whilst delivering a stronger environmental 
outcome more robust against future uncertainties. 
RPAs would not be quick to reach agreement on. A 
coalition of countries setting national price floors could 
emerge as an intermediate step to support the carbon 
price for investments in their countries, and this could 
strengthen the case for a Europe-wide agreement. This 
would to some extent mirror the way that the EU ETS 
itself was born, after the UK and Denmark had developed 
emissions pricing schemes, partly out of the desire to 
forestall a wider proliferation of national schemes. 
The international context
The EU ETS has been a cornerstone not only of the 
EU’s domestic effort to cap emissions and comply with 
its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, but also of 
its international strategy more broadly. In this it has 
indeed played an important role. 
It has given real credibility to the EU’s drive to help 
foster a more broad-based, global response. It has 
demonstrated that it is possible to establish cap-
and-trade for industrial CO2 emissions, and yielded 
many valuable lessons about design and implications. 
Amongst these, it has shown that so far, in all three 
phases it has been far easier to achieve the negotiated 
caps than initially expected, and shed valuable light 
on the practical economic implications for various 
sectors.28 It has also been the major driving force of 
the Clean Development Mechanism, which despite its 
limitations has supported lower carbon investment 
across many developing countries and thus helped to 
engage developing countries actively in the climate 
change mitigation in ways that would have been 
inconceivable without it. With the recent fall in EU ETS 
prices, the price of CDM emission credits has fallen 
towards  
€3/tCO2, rendering it virtually irrelevant in supporting 
the economics of low carbon investments in developing 
countries (Figure 1).29
Figure 7: EU ETS Prices compared against Australian and Californian ETS price corridors
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25 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bIM-PRESS%2b20120227IPR39335%2b0%2bDOC
%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN. 
26 See separate Annex for details.
27 The Annex is published separately on the Climate Strategies’ website
28 See for example, the Climate Strategies report, “Ten Insights from the EU ETS”, www.climatestrategies.org
29 For recent data and indication of issues see presentation by Axel Michaelowa to Climate Strategies seminar in Copenhagen, 19th January 
2012, available from www.climatestrategies.org.
30 For a recent fuller overview of existing and emerging international systems see Climate Strategies (2012): A. Tuerk, M.Mehling, S. Klinsky and 
X. Wang, Analysis and comparison of different kinds of carbon constraints, March 2012.
31 The Australian CPM commences with a fixed price for three years and then moves to a price corridor for the subsequent three years, with the 
price ceiling defined as being AUD20 above the “international price”; in the diagram we have illustrated it as AUD20 above the floor price. For a 
fuller discussion on the Australian scheme see R.Betz, presentation to Climate Strategies seminar in Copenhagen, 19th January 2012, available 
from www.climatestrategies.org.
The Californian floor starts at USD10/tCO2 in 2013, rising each year thereafter by 5% plus inflation. The price “ceiling” consists of a set of three 
tiered reserves (reserves created by set asides) Tier 1: 40$ metric ton CO2e in 2013, rising each year thereafter by 5% plus inflation Tier 2: $45 
(ditto) Tier $3: 50 (ditto). For simplicity the diagram takes the central reserve level and also illustrates as linear. 
The RGGI scheme was a much earlier scheme established amongst the north-east states of the USA, confined to electricity generators, and 
intended initially to give impetus to Federal efforts. It has a price floor, which despite being very low has proved important as this scheme 
(like others) has ended up with overall surplus. Without the price floor, prices would likely have fallen to zero (mirroring the EU ETS Phase I 
experience). Revenues from the scheme are used mainly to support energy efficiency programmes, and the price floor has protected the ability 
to plan and run such programmes. The RGGI experience has emphasised that even with a substantial surplus, there could still be trading at 
a price somewhat above the reserve price; with the RPA removing downside risk of buying (or holding on to) allowances, the prospect of high 
prices in the future thus has a much stronger role on the present price and trading activity even with substantial surplus. 
Despite the USA not agreeing a Federal cap-and-
trade scheme in 2010, the EU’s exemplar has proved 
fruitful. States in the north-east of the USA established 
in 2009 a regional cap-and-trade programme for 
electricity power generation (the “Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative”, RGGI), while last year Australia and 
California both passed cap-and-trade legislation.  
Early in 2012, the Korean Parliament voted to do so, 
with bipartisan support making it likely the legislation 
will go through this year. At the last count, China is 
establishing thirteen pilot cap-and-trade schemes 
encompassing five provinces and eight cities, and 
covering an estimated 19% of Chinese emissions.  
Perhaps having learned from the evolution of the EU 
ETS, both the Australian and Californian schemes 
are designed to give greater confidence for both 
investors and revenue applications, protecting against 
price uncertainties in the initial years of the scheme 
by establishing price corridor mechanisms (Figure 
7). Just as the ETS demonstrated the feasibility of 
CO2 emissions cap-and-trade, these newer schemes 
demonstrate the feasibility of mechanisms to address 
concerns about price uncertainty, and the conclusion 
that others reached about their desirability. The 
EU ETS is not alone in its need to address risk and 
uncertainty for investors in emissions pricing; in 
common with other schemes, the EU ETS needs to 
maintain the wider balance of environment and cost. 
At present and forecast (without intervention) price 
levels, the EU ETS will have a much diminished role in 
terms of contributing to the EU’s international financial 
commitments on climate change (either directly 
through offsets or indirectly as a source for public 
financial contributions); more broadly, it risks reducing 
the EU’s profile and credibility in the international 
climate policy arena. An interesting additional features 
is that the Australian price ceiling is set in relation 
to ($20 above) the prevailing international prices. It 
remains to be seen how Australia will determine such 
an international price, but it would presumably take 
into account the ETS price. Conversely, the collapse 
of ETS prices to argue that Australia has stepped 
too far ahead and should weaken or abandon its 
system. These are additional, specific examples of 
how a stronger EU ETS could help to support stronger 
international action. 
These are additional reasons for taking action, and for EU 
institutions to consider the lessons from the existing and 
other emerging schemes such as in the USA and Asia. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS
It is well recognised (and was known at the time 
of adopting the Phase III Directive) that the linear 
reduction factor agreed in the EU ETS Directive was 
not sufficient to deliver long term climate goals. This 
level of annual reduction was a compromise, driven by 
concern about the possible costs of a more ambitious 
target, and hopes for a global agreement that could 
facilitate strengthening. Global negotiations have 
slowly moved forward: at the same time, the EU ETS 
is already achieving its quantity objective at far lower 
cost than projected. That underpins a generic case for 
moving the system closer to what is needed to achieve 
deep emissions reductions over the long term. There is 
also a value to predictability and stability, and finding 
the right combination and balance is key to the future 
of the EU ETS.
The European economic and political situation in 2012 
makes it harder to build political support for far-sighted 
action on energy and climate policy. However, the 
move to greater auctioning in Phase III may help to 
focus political attention, and offers a mechanism for 
stability that was not previously available. Governments 
around Europe need revenue, and it is hard to budget 
on the basis of EU ETS auction revenues which are so 
uncertain (and which, without intervention, could fall 
further if economic conditions become even bleaker). 
Industry across Europe can also benefit from a more 
stable platform for energy sector investment.
A ‘coalition’ of national policies may be the most 
politically plausible outcome, but a European-level 
solution would help to simplify the diverse challenges 
faced in many countries. Core European countries thus 
have clear interest in co-operating to strengthen the 
ETS Europe-wide, rather than going their own way.32  
An irony of the present resistance to considering 
price-related options is, of course, that the pressure 
to intervene comes from the fear of the consequences 
of prices being too low. As indicated, set-aside seems 
necessary to re-establish an effective market. The 
logical question in addition is whether it is a good 
idea to reach a European consensus (or compromise) 
on what policymakers consider to be “too low”. If so, 
an RPA would underpin this, and also preclude the 
possible need for further market intervention.
As also emphasised, the ETS is not the only policy 
needed. Varied regulations and incentives around 
energy efficiency and renewables are necessary and 
have proven effective. The EU also needs urgently 
to start defining more clearly a vision and specific 
policies towards 2030. But the goals and instruments 
can and should be complementary. A strong EU ETS 
could provide funds for necessary investment in low-
carbon energy supply and efficiency programmes. 
In combination with a stronger and more stable 
platform for energy investment, this has the potential 
to strengthen the European economy, not weaken it. 
A strong EU ETS could also help the EU maintain its 
leadership position in international climate discussions, 
building upon its success at the Durban climate summit. 
This report’s specific conclusion is that the EU ETS 
should be strengthened by accepting the combined 
importance of quantity, price, and foresight: by setting 
aside allowances, moving to set a reserve price on 
future allowance auctions, and launching negotiations 
on its framework to 2030. More fundamentally though, 
the EU should seize the impetus of the current crisis 
to not only set aside allowances, but also conduct a 
pragmatic and thorough assessment of all the options 
for reinvigorating the EU ETS and clarifying its enduring 
role in a wider, more integrated, European climate and 
energy policy. 
32 For example, Germany has a need for auction revenues to help finance its ambitions in the energy sector, and the UK floor price could be 
disruptive if not set in a European-level solution. The core political challenge may be whether and how EU solutions can address also the 
interests and concerns of member states with emissions-intensive industry, particularly in eastern Europe. At the same time, eastern European 
countries will see reduced revenue from continued weakening of the EU ETS, particularly given the clause on 12% redistribution of revenues.
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